EDA INSIGHT

Combatting Daesh in Libya
Dr. Saskia van Genugten

April 2016

ACADEMIC PROGRAMMES | EXECUTIVE EDUCATION | **RESEARCH & ANALYSIS**

Summary

- Daesh, amongst other terrorist groups, is exploiting Libya's chaos and has claimed control over a significant strip of land. Its **potential access to oil, trafficking networks and African recruits** increases the threat.

- A further growth of Daesh in Libya could **negatively impact the outlook of neighbouring countries, including Egypt** which shares 1,115 kilometres of borders with Libya.

- Clear defeats in Libya will **weaken Daesh propaganda**, whereas "success stories", as well as premature military intervention, could help it attract new followers, including in West and Sub-Saharan Africa.

- Daesh expansion in Libya was helped by its strong ties to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, booming migrant smuggling, **assistance from former regime loyalists** and defections from other extremist groups.

- Fears have been raised that Daesh in Libya could potentially forge alliances with other Africa-based extremist groups. But for the moment, **violent competition** between them is the more likely scenario.

- Another risk is that Daesh could infiltrate Libya's smuggling and trafficking networks and recruit amongst economically-deprived migrants, providing **easily accessible financial and human resources**.

- Libyan authorities and allies need to find the right countering approach **in a mix of mutually reinforcing policy-instruments**, including diplomacy, resource disruption, border management and military support.

- Mediation could be intensified at the level of **civil society, security actors and economic elites**, encouraging local ceasefires, preventing a split in vital financial institutions and overcoming the current economic crisis.

- Any military intervention should go hand in hand with building up **solid political and security institutions**, absorbing different militia into a united force and prioritising improvements in the daily life of the Libyan population.

What is the Issue?

Libya's ongoing lawlessness, combined with its location along key African trafficking routes, has created an enabling environment for terrorist groups. On Libyan soil, a myriad of regional extremist groups currently meets, recruits, trains, propagandises and plots operations in relative tranquillity.

While Daesh, also known as the Islamic State, is only one of many extremist groups in North Africa, its rapid rise in Libya, its heinous brutality and its global ambitions have made it into a key concern for national and international policy-makers. Daesh has put Libya back into the international spotlight.

In the first months of 2016, the Libyan National Army has successfully chased extremists from several neighbourhoods of the eastern city of Benghazi. The US military has used targeted airstrikes to destroy a training camp near the western city of Sabratha and to kill a number of terrorist leaders. Misratan forces have also directly challenged Daesh forces. Still, the terrorist group's position in central Sirte remains relatively unchallenged and cells remain active throughout the country.

To defeat Daesh in Libya and to reduce the terrorist threats stemming from the current chaos, more needs to be done. This EDA Insight aims at providing policy-makers with a better understanding of the strength, strategy and tactics of Daesh in Libya as well as an analysis of the range of policy instruments the international community could employ in order to help the legitimate Libyan authorities in their efforts to combat terrorism.

The Growth of Daesh in Libya

Libya's history with violent extremism dates back to the Soviet Afghan War, when a number of returnees from that war established the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Muammer al-Qaddafi's rule forced Libya's extremists underground. Many LIFG fighters ended up in prison, while others took cover in the Green Mountain area in eastern Libya. Still others decided to keep fighting their battles abroad: on a per capita basis, Libya provided one of the highest numbers of fighters for conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.[1]

The 2011 uprisings in the Arab World and the fall of Qaddafi's regime changed the dynamics. The number of militant Islamist factions openly and brazenly operating in Libya multiplied as they successfully took advantage of the weakened state authorities in Libya.[2] Forces of law and order became less effective and control over borders and mosques faltered.

Post-Qaddafi Libya provided a home for a large number of extremist groups, including several branches of Ansar al Sharia, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and individual brigades such as the Abu Salim Brigade in the city of Derna. Extremist groups operating in the broader Sahel-Sahara region successfully tapped into the arms and ammunition depot that Libya had become. Beneficiaries included Mokhtar Belmokhtar's al-Mourabitoun, Nigeria's Boko Haram, separatist Tuaregs, Somalia's al-Shabaab, Algeria's Jamaat Jund al-Khalifa and Egypt's Ansar Bait al Maqdis.

Daesh first emerged in Libya in 2014, when a group of foreign fighters returned from Iraq and Syria to their hometown in eastern Libya, the city of Derna. The Derna returnees initially established the Islamic Youth Shura Council and after several months, the group pledged allegiance to Daesh's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Inspired by pre-colonial times in which a unified Libya did not exist, Daesh declared eastern Libya as its Caliphate's province of Barqa (*Wilayat Barqa*). But as a sign that Daesh would not easily take root in Libya, an alliance of local extremist militia chased it out of the city in June 2015 - around nine months after the group had taken over control. Daesh retreated to Derna's outskirts, the Green Mountains and the coastal city of Sirte.

Daesh is often considered as imported and alien to Libya's tribal society. Nonetheless, it did have significant success in Sirte. There, it rapidly established control over a strip of land stretching along the Mediterranean coast for more than 200 kilometres. Daesh renamed it as the Caliphate's province of Tarablus (*Wilayat Tarablus*). The land around Sirte is the only significant territory the group holds outside of Iraq and Syria.

In the western part of Libya, Daesh has cells at least in the cities of Tripoli, Misrata and Sabratha. It also has made appearances in the South, where it seeks to establish the Caliphate's third Libyan province, *Wilayat Fezzan*. Leadership in Libya was initially given to Abu Nabil, also known as Wissam Najm Abd Zayd al-Zubaydi. In November 2015, he was killed in a US airstrike and in March 2016, Daesh announced his successor to be Abdul Qadr al-Najdi.

Current estimates of the numbers of Daesh fighters in Libya range quite dramatically: from UN estimates of around 3,000 to US intelligence estimates of 6,500 and an estimate of 10,000 by the French authorities.[3] Despite the uncertainty around the numbers, most analysts agree that the group constitutes an evident short-term and long-term threat.

In the past two years, the group has staged a string of attacks and brutal acts. Among them the beheading of 21 Egyptians, the assault on a luxury hotel in Tripoli, attacks against the United Nations, the bombing of a police graduation ceremony in the town of Zliten, the killing of local officers in Sabratha and, in Sirte, the execution of citizens considered as spies, sorcerers or other "sinners".

The lawlessness, the uncontrolled borders and the inability of Libya's political class to prioritise stability over infighting, have helped Daesh establish itself in Libya. But several additional aspects factored into its rapid rise. These included the close relations with the core organisation, a booming migrant smuggling business, the co-optation of former Qaddafi loyalists and the successful poaching of existing extremists.

Close relations with the core organisation

Daesh in Libya entertains close relations with the core organization in Iraq and Syria. Libyan factions, organised as the al-Battar brigade, were instrumental in many key battles there. Daesh's leadership has actively called upon supporters to travel to Libya and also dispatched several prominent fighters, clerics and (media) technicians to assist the Libyan branch. Envoys included the Bahraini Turki Binali, the Yemeni Abu al-Bara al-Azdi and the Saudi Abu Habib al-Jazrawi.[4]

Booming migrant smuggling business

Libya's location, in the centre of North Africa and between Africa and Europe, has historically given it a prominent role in illicit trade and trafficking. In recent years, the booming migrant smuggling business has massively increased the profits that can be made – attracting many unsavoury groups. North, West and Sub-Saharan Africa provide an inexhaustible pool of young men eager to join Daesh – whether driven by ideology or by the prospect of a (better) salary.

Co-optation of former Qaddafi-loyalists

In Sirte, Daesh co-opted former Qaddafi-supporters and extended its control through political agreements with surrounding towns. As the place of birth and death of Qaddafi, Libya's post-2011 authorities deliberately neglected the city and its inhabitants. Some of the pro-Qaddafi tribes are likely to see Daesh as a temporary evil that could potentially help them stage a comeback. Others might believe it is at least bringing back some form of organised life.

Successful poaching of existing extremists

Daesh in Libya has successfully poached fighters from more established extremist groups in the region, including from AQIM, Ansar al Sharia, Boko Haram and Al Shabaab. Aware of the fact that it needs a critical mass of experienced and well-connected fighters and ideologues, Daesh tries to offer better salaries and more perks. And perhaps just as important, it offers a start-up mentality with opportunities to quickly rise through the ranks.

Transnational Threats and Regional Risks

Daesh in Libya is a threat in similar ways as it is in Syria, Iraq and elsewhere: it terrorises innocent people, disregards any national and international institutions and conventions and it does so despicably under the false banner of Islam. The UAE Ambassador to the United States, His Excellency Yousef al Otaiba, aptly described the war against extremism as "not a war against Islam. On the contrary. It is a battle to save Islam from a death cult that is hijacking an entire religion to sell an ideology of hate and murder".[5]

The fact that Daesh actually controls territory in Libya has enabled the group to train, plot and plan large-scale attacks in relative tranquillity. The 2013 attack against the In Amenas oil and gas facility in Algeria was launched from Libya and so were the 2015 attacks at Tunisia's Bardo museum and the beach in Sousse.

The threat of this terrorist safe-haven is further compounded due to:

- its proximity to large oil and gas fields;
- the possibility that it could tie itself into trafficking and smuggling networks and use those networks to infiltrate the refugee flows towards Europe; and
- the possibility that it could either forge alliances with other Africa-based extremist groups, or conversely, engage in a violent competition with those groups.

Proximity to energy industries

In the past months, Daesh has launched damaging attacks on Libya's oil installations, causing further losses to Libya's energy sector – losses said to exceed US$68 billion.[6] Different from the situation in Iraq and Syria, for the moment, Daesh is unable to control, exploit or market any of the oil resources. Therefore, its current strategy is one of sabotage aimed at denying Libya's faltering authorities state revenues.

From Sirte, Daesh terrorises the facilities at Al Sidra and Ras Lanuf, which are guarded by the private forces of separatist Ibrahim Jadhran. Close to the Tunisian border and Sabratha, Daesh has been active near the Melitta oil and gas complex, which is co-run by Italy's energy giant ENI and is the hub of the Greenstream pipeline carrying natural gas to Italy.

Integration with trafficking networks

The prospect of Daesh integrating itself into the lucrative trafficking networks connecting sub-Saharan Africa with Europe is also daunting. Cities in Libya's southern desert, including Ubari, Ghat, Sebha and Kufra, thrive on the smuggling of drugs, cigarettes, weapons and migrants.[7] AQIM is already successfully leveraging this lucrative trade in the south, mainly by building alliances with local, disenfranchised Tuaregs.

At the moment, new opportunities are arising in Libya's coastal cities. The illegal smuggling of migrants has become a booming business. While it is difficult to measure the actual size of the migrant trade, according to a publication of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime, it grew from a value of around US$8-20 million before 2011 to around US$255-323 million in 2015 in Libya alone.[8] This provides easily accessible financial resources for many individual Libyans as well as for underground networks, including terrorist groups. This has also raised fears that terrorists can infiltrate the migration and refugee flows to Europe, increasing the security threat.

Cooperation or competition?

With Libya's continuing lawlessness, the illegal economy expanding and an ongoing supply of potential recruits, the extremist market in Libya is getting crowded. This allows for collaboration and economies of scale, but it also creates the risk of a violent competition between different extremist groups.[9]

According to *The New York Times*, extremists have increased collaboration, allowing for the transfer of expertise.[10] In contrast to many of its local and regional peers, Daesh has set itself global objectives. The group has actively promoted such regional cooperation and has stepped up recruitment in West and Sub-Saharan Africa. This approach is partly driven by ideology and partly by the necessity of local alliances for its survival. Daesh wants to make Libya into a place where groups such as AQIM, Ansar al Sharia, al-Mourabitoun, Boko Haram, separatists Tuaregs, al-Shabaab, Jamaat Jund al-Khalifa, Ansar Bait al Maqdi and others could be united in their overarching political quest.

Increased cooperation between extremists from Somalia to Senegal would constitute a major setback for counterterrorism efforts around the globe. However, despite the rhetoric, the current spectrum of extremist groups in Africa remains deeply fragmented and individual goals are often local or regional, rather than global.[11] The leadership of AQIM has identified Daesh in Libya as a major threat and Ansar al Sharia and LIFG consider Daesh as the outsider.

Therefore, in the short term, an opposite scenario - of increased competition - is more likely to materialise. Currently, locally anchored groups are backing either Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Daesh, or Ayman Zawahiri and Al Qaeda. Unfortunately, the prospect of a showdown between two larger coalitions of extremist groups is perhaps just as threatening as the prospect of their cooperation.

Assisting the Libyans in their Fight against Daesh

A successful strategy to combat Daesh in Libya will first and foremost depend on the political will of the Libyan politicians and militias currently involved in the protracted civil war. Nonetheless, given the transnational nature of the threats the situation is generating, it is in the interest of many members of the international community to support the Libyan authorities in their efforts.

National and international policymakers need to find, collectively, the right mix of policy instruments, including in the fields of:

- diplomacy and mediation;
- disrupting access to financial resources;
- border management and border security;
- short-term economic and humanitarian aid; and
- military support

Diplomacy and mediation

Libya's political and security fragmentation remains the key obstacle to confronting Daesh. Acknowledging that any sustainable solution has to come from the Libyans themselves, the key focus of the international community, since summer 2014, has been the UN-led multi-track Libyan Political Dialogue.

This has led to the December 2015 signing and endorsement of the Libyan Political Agreement, the formation of an inclusive power-sharing Government of National Accord (GNA) and several local ceasefires and reconciliation initiatives. In March 2016, members of the international community started to recognise the GNA, based on the support provided by a majority of the internationally-recognised House of Representatives (HoR). Even though an official vote of confidence has not yet materialised, a majority of the HoR members signed a statement in February 2016 approving the GNA as proposed by the Presidency Council.

Despite the many successes, the process has also been marred by endless debates, setbacks and delays. Similarly, the road ahead for the GNA is likely to be full of obstacles. First, it needs to get substantial domestic support and will need to consolidate its presence in the Libyan capital Tripoli. Next, it will need to deliver on its ambitious work programme as stipulated in the Political Agreement.[12] Given the current situation in Libya, fighting Daesh will be just one of its many tasks and priorities.

To increase the chances of a successful and sustainable GNA, support for the political dialogue should continue, both in terms of resources and political commitment. This includes encouraging the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement and backing the efforts of Martin Kobler, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to broaden the support for the agreement, including at the level of Libya's civil society, youth and women organisations as well as regarding Libya's security actors and Libya's economic elites.

Mediation could assist in brokering further local ceasefires, focusing in particular on areas where fighting is currently shutting down vital infrastructure such as energy industries, pipelines and airports. Breakthroughs could feed into a national ceasefire. At the same time, it would activate communication channels between former rivals, which is a necessity in order to take on Daesh collectively.

Mediation can also help in bringing a solution to the current duplication efforts and rival claims to Libya's sovereign economic and financial institutions. This includes the ownership and operations of the Libyan Central Bank, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA). Clarity of who is responsible for what is an important step towards tackling Libya's alarming economic decline and will be one of the first priorities of a GNA.[13]

Disrupting access to financial resources

To disrupt Daesh's access to resources, one needs first of all to have a good understanding of what these resources are and where they come from. For the moment, there is not much concrete information on how Daesh in Libya finances itself. Libya certainly offers plenty of opportunities for a pillage economy, as it is rich in antiquities and money can be skimmed from traffickers. Daesh also taxes civilians and is engaged in extortion and armed robbery.[14]

As also recommended by the UN, the international community should make an effort to add known Daesh members and entities associated with Daesh operating in Libya to the current Al Qaeda sanction list.[15]

Countries should also continue to strengthen their Anti-Money Laundering and Combatting the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regimes. They could establish well-regulated Financial Intelligence Units that cooperate with similar units elsewhere. In additon, while a lot of money is likely to be moved around in cash, the November 2015 Paris attacks highlighted once more that better ways need to be found to monitor virtual currency exchange platforms and ownership of prepaid cards.

Border management and border security

Libya's weak and corrupted borders are a key reason it acts as a safe haven and meeting place for extremists. When pro-Qaddafi forces retreated from their positions in 2011, a myriad of local militias started managing border checkpoints. Often, these new guards had tribal and ethnic roots with communities across the border. Together they advanced the interest of themselves and trans-Saharan traffickers.

Qaddafi had tolerated the illegal trade, but had made sure the state controlled it. Within the vacuum of authority of the past five years, many local fights have broken out between tribal and ethnic communities, all of them eager to control these checkpoints. The communities most often involved include the Tebu, the Tuaregs and the Awlad Sulaiman.[16]

A successful fight against extremism will require securing Libya's borders and changing the system that has taken root post-2011. It would mean streamlining the work of border control officers, who currently have unclear and diverse reporting lines and tend to make arbitrary decisions. However, creating an integrated border management system to control the 4,300 kilometres of remote land borders has proven extremely difficult. Smugglers know how to circumvent border checkpoints and kin ties in Libya tend to be of greater importance than state loyalty – which is unlikely to change anytime soon.[17]

Members of the international community have launched initiatives to help Libya secure its borders. For example, the European Union (EU) started a border management assistance mission in Libya in 2013 (EUBAM Libya). The mission is supposed to support capacity building to secure Libya's land, sea and air borders. In February 2016, the EU announced that the mission would be extended until August 2016. However, the fact that the mission is currently operating out of Tunis, shows that effective border management for Libya is still a faraway goal.[18]

Acknowledging this, others have started to enhance their own security by fortifying borders from the other side. Tunisia has constructed a 200-kilometre long barrier along its border with Libya.[19] To help Tunis counter illegal border movements, the United Kingdom has dispatched a 20-person strong training team.[20] Egypt has asked the US to help it construct mobile surveillance sensor towers to monitor its own border with Libya.

The current refugee crisis is putting a lot of pressure on Libya's borders. Related to this crisis rather than to the threat of terrorism, the EU has an ongoing military mission in the Mediterranean Sea (EUNAFVOR MED), launched in June 2015 and headquartered in Rome.

The chief objective is "identifying, capturing and disposing of vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers".[21] As such, the mission only indirectly tries to monitor and secure Libya's 1,770 kilometres of coastline.

Despite the evident challenges, members of the international community should continue to explore ways to support a future GNA and Libya's neighbours, in strengthening border controls and to alleviate the pressure on these borders. The dire need for this might grow further in the near future. With the March 2016 closure of the Balkan route, Syrian refugees, and others trying to reach Europe might attempt to do so via the Central Mediterranean route (from Tunisia and Libya to Italy and Malta).

Short-term economic and humanitarian aid

At the moment, Libya is forecasted to have the fastest shrinking economy of the globe in 2016.[22] In February 2016, the United Nation's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) issued a bulletin with the title "Libya: the crisis that should not be".[23] Indeed, Libya's citizens have always been considered wealthy as they had, for decades, one of the highest GDPs *per capita* in the region.

GDP per head ($ at PPP)

Legend: Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Tunisia

Data source: Economist Intelligence Unit

The protracted civil war is taking its toll and the Libyan economy is in shambles. Rival claims to Libya's economic and financial assets are going hand-in-hand with mismanagement, increased corruption and higher inflation as banks suffer from a growing liquidity crisis.

Accurate data is difficult to obtain. According to a report of the International Crisis Group, Libya's fiscal deficit for 2015 was between 42% and 68% of GDP.[24] International reserves are also dwindling rapidly and low oil output and low oil prices are exacerbating the situation. A further drying up of foreign reserves will be disastrous for the Libyan economy, which relies for a large part on imported goods.

OCHA estimated in February 2016 that 2.4 million out of Libya's 6 million inhabitants are in need of some form of humanitarian assistance. An estimated 435,000 Libyans have been internally displaced since mid-2014. More than 40% of the health care facilities are non-functioning and more than 80% of all the nursing staff was evacuated in 2014. The humanitarian appeal of the UN agencies for US$165.6 million, has remained 97.3% unfunded.[25]

Short-term economic and humanitarian assistance will not directly help fight Daesh. Nonetheless, adding a severe economic crisis to Libya's problems is likely to make the current situation worse. Economic deprivation tends to create fertile ground for extremism and might further increase migrant flows towards Europe.

Members of the international community can assist a future GNA with tackling corruption and economic mismanagement, as well as help it design diversification strategies. In the meantime, efforts could focus on ensuring the Libyan population will not be deprived of basic goods and services.

Military support

To defeat Daesh, some form of military action is needed. The Libyan National Army is the key actor currently taking on Daesh in Benghazi. In the west of the country, Misratan forces have directly challenged the terrorist organisation, while the forces of Jadhran are engaged in protecting Libya's oil facilities against Daesh' attacks. The US is providing ad hoc support with reconnaissance flights and targeted airstrikes.

The formation of a GNA has sparked debates about intensification of military support to Libya's future authorities, including through the lifting of the current arms embargo. At the same time, the possibility of there not being a viable GNA any time soon, has spurred some members of the international community on to step up unilateral actions.

External actors are already present and engaged in several military missions in the region. In the countries of the Sahel and the Sahara, the US supports activities in the field of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and counterterrorism. Expanding regional presence, the US recently opened a new drone base in Northern Cameroon.[26]

French troops are also active in the region. The 2013-2014 Operation Serval, and its ongoing successor Operation Barkhane, successfully weakened terrorist presence in Mali. However, a large group that included Mokhtar Belmokhtar, decided to leave Northern Mali as a result and found refuge in Libya.

eda.ac.ae

Recently added developments, plans and proposals include the presence of Special Operation Forces flying reconnaissance planes and seeking allies in the fight against Daesh. They also include pledges for various training missions, both for the Libyan authorities and for its direct neighbours.[27] French forces are said to be involved in the Libyan National Army's anti-Daesh operations in Benghazi and according to Stratfor, satellite imagery confirms a French presence at the nearby Benina air base.[28]

Italy is pushing hardest for a more forcible response and has proposed an Italian-led international assistance mission focusing on stabilization, counter-terrorism and counter-migration, which could include around 6,000 troops. Still, most members of the international community are not interested in providing boots on the ground in Libya or in going beyond training and intelligence missions.

On whatever military presence the international community settles, several constraining factors should be kept in mind:

• A large number of Libyans is deeply suspicious of foreign meddling in their affairs and have opposed any explicit external intervention. Libya's neighbours are also likely to raise objections to any intervention, especially a Western one.

• Military intervention at a moment that the appeal of Daesh has not yet been sufficiently weakened could be counterproductive and strengthen Daesh's recruitment narrative.

• Military support might shatter any fragile, emerging unity in Libya. In case support goes to a selection of groups fighting for narrow, local interests, it risks exacerbating existing rivalries.

• Military intervention can further displace populations and fighters and just shift the problem elsewhere.

• Libya is not lacking well-trained forces. It is lacking cooperation and integration between different militias and forces. Training missions should thus focus on bringing militias together and integrating communication and command structures, with the aim of rebuilding a new structure absorbing the different militias into a united army.

Given the above, any military support or intervention should at the same time encourage unity and integration of the many semi-autonomous militias. The largest obstacle to this remains Libya's broken state. Thus any usage of the military policy instrument has to go hand in hand with building up, in an inclusive way, political and security institutions that can help improve the current outlook of the Libyan population.

Endnotes

1) "Foreign fighters: an updated assessment of the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq", The Soufan Group, December 2015, http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf

2) UNSC letter dated 18 November 2015 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council, UNSC S/2015/891.

3) See UNSC letter dated 18 November 2015, UNSC S/2015/891 and Issandr al Amrani, "How much of Libya does the Islamic State Control?", Foreign Policy, 18 February 2016.

4) Frederic Wehrey and Ala' Al-Rababa'h, "Rising out of chaos: the Islamic State in Libya", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5 March 2015.

5) Yousef al Otaiba, "A positive agenda for the Middle East", CSIS Middle East Program, 29 January 2016, http://csis.org/files/attachments/160129_Ambassador_Al_Otaiba_CSIS_Remarks.pdf

6) Anjli Raval, "War and strive have cost Libya $68 bn in lost oil revenues", Financial Times, 26 January 2016, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4dc800de-c27a-11e5-b3b1-7b2481276e45.html#axzz428ygm0ri

7) Frontex, "Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community Joint Report", January 2016, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AFIC_report_2015.pdf

8) The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, "Libya: a growing hub for criminal economies and terrorist financing in the trans-Sahara", 11 May 2015, http://www.globalinitiative.net/download/global-initiative/Libya%20Criminal%20Economies%20in%20the%20trans-Sahara%20-%20May%202015.pdf

9) NATO Parliamentary Assembly,Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group, "Daesh: the challenge to regional and international security", 15 September 2015.

10) Carlotta Gall, "Jihadists deepen collaboration in North Africa", 1 January 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/02/world/africa/jihadists-deepen-collaboration-in-north-africa.html

11) Wolfram Lacher and Guido Steinberg, "Spreading local roots: AQIM and its offshoots in the Sahara", in Steinberg and Weber (eds,), Jihadism in Africa, June 2015, p. 82.

12) The Libyan Political Agreement, as signed on 17 December 2015, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=miXuJYkQAQg%3D&tabid=3559&mid=6187&language=en-US

13) "The Prize: Fighting for Libya's Energy Wealth", International Crisis Group, 3 December 2015. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/North%20Africa/libya/165-the-prize-fighting-for-libya-s-energy-wealth.pdf

14) See UNSC letter dated 18 November 2015, UNSC S/2015/891.

15) See UNSC letter dated 18 November 2015, UNSC S/2015/891.

16) Rebecca Murray, "Libya's southern rivalries", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 10 December 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/?fa=57470

17) Shivit Bakrani, "Libya: Border security and regional cooperation: rapid literature review", January 2014, http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/gsdrc_libya.pdf

18) European Council, "Libya: border management assistance mission amended and extended", 15 February 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/15-fac-libya-border-management/

19) Conor Gaffey, "Can Tunisia's border barrier stop extremism entering from Libya?", Newsweek, 9 February 2016, http://europe.newsweek.com/can-tunisias-border-barrier-stop-extremism-entering-libya-424531?rm=eu

20) "UK to send troops to Tunisia to help stop ISIS crossing Tunisian border". Reuters, 1 March 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-tunisia-libya-idUKKCN0W33OY

21) See factsheet of the European Union Naval Force – Mediterranean, Operation Sophia, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eunavfor-med/pdf/factsheet_eunavfor_med_en.pdf

22) See Economist Intelligence Unit forecast, http://www.economist.com/news/economic-and-financial-indicators/21684788-fastest-shrinking-and-growing-economies-2016-gdp-forecasts

23) OCHA, "Libya: the crisis that should not be", Humanitarian Bulletin, 16 February 2016. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Humanitarian%20Bulletin%20-%20V1.11%20-%2022022016.pdf

24) "The Prize: Fighting for Libya's Energy Wealth", International Crisis Group, 3 December 2015, p 25.

25) OCHA, "Libya: the crisis that should not be", Humanitarian Bulletin, 16 February 2016.

26) "Fact Sheet on US support for peace, security and countering violent extremism in Africa", Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/27/fact-sheet-us-support-peace-security-and-countering-violent-extremism

27) "Confronting failed government and the Islamic State in Libya", IISS Strategic Comments, 22 (1), February 2016.

28) "The West moves discreetly into Libya", Stratfor, 9 March 2016.