

EDA INSIGHT

Trump's Proposed Foreign Aid Policies: Potential Implications for MENA

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Executive Summary

- Many large Western donors are experiencing a trend towards more 'populist' politics. The tendency to favor policies that resonate with the electorate is likely to change these donors' foreign aid priorities in the MENA region.
- Right-leaning populists tend to argue for cutting foreign aid, as they see it as a waste of good money that could be better spent at home. Those taking a compromise position tend to call for foreign aid being tied to national security considerations.
- The US has long played a key role in the Middle East, with foreign aid being an important policy tool in advancing US regional interests. Since 1946, the US has provided over US\$290 billion in foreign assistance to the region. More than 80 percent has been directed to Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Palestine (West Bank and Gaza) alone.
- Most of the aid money to MENA countries falls under Foreign Military Financing. Other non-humanitarian US aid to the region covers economic support, health programs and development assistance, aimed at economic development and building human capital.
- An examination of US President Donald Trump's 'Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again' provides some indications regarding what direction his administration wants US foreign aid to the MENA region to take.
- According to this 'Budget Blueprint', the Trump Administration wants to merge USAID into the State Department, reduce aid to developing countries by 30 percent, reduce funding for international organizations by 31 percent and increase spending on defense and immigration enforcement.
- With regard to the MENA, the Trump Administration envisions cuts in bilateral assistance to most countries in the region (except for Egypt and Israel), cuts in democracy and human rights promotion and cuts to migration and refugee assistance.
- The overall budget for MENA is proposed to be cut by US\$ 850 million. As part of the proposals, Tunisia would see a 67 percent reduction in bilateral aid coming from the US, Jordan and Lebanon might face cuts of around 22 percent.
- The US programs on Migration and Refugee Assistance, International Disaster Assistance and Food for Peace will be curbed and less emphasis will be given to economic development and building human capital. Instead, the focus will shift to defense, border security, and immigration enforcement.
- At a time when 60 percent of the MENA region's population is under the age of 25, with an average youth unemployment of 45 percent, the US cuts in foreign aid towards the region will leave a large gap in necessary programs.
- Gulf donors, the UAE in particular, are well positioned to fill the void left by the US. Targeted funds could be allocated to development assistance projects that invest in human capital and support economic growth, including through promoting entrepreneurship and support for small and medium enterprises.

The Issue

Two political developments in 2016 took most analysts and pundits by surprise. In June, nearly 52 percent of the British electorate voted to withdraw from the European Union, giving rise to the term Brexit. In November, Donald J. Trump, viewed by some as a controversial American billionaire, won the US presidential elections.¹

Both developments cemented increasing speculation about rising populist nationalism and potential political volatility in the Euro-American hemisphere. While spanning a wide political spectrum, populism denotes anti-establishment sentiment, creating a framework that pits the 'common people' against a 'corrupt elite'.² In light of the surge of populist movements in Europe, including in Austria, Denmark, France and the Netherlands, the Brexit vote and President Trump's victory can no longer be viewed as isolated phenomena. They seem to indicate a nationalist trend reminiscent of the early 20th century.

This trend is likely to change the foreign aid priorities of major Western donors to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. As the grievances of those voting for Brexit and Trump indicate, economic insecurity and cultural backlash against progressive values are at the heart of rising populism in these countries. Demanding that their governments turn their attention to domestic issues, Brexit and Trump proponents tend to have less favorable views of foreign aid. In particular, in the case of the US, Trump supporters have expressed their view that the US engages in global affairs more than its fair share – a sentiment that their president has conveyed openly in a variety of venues at home and abroad.

The countries in the MENA region have had different levels of need when it comes to foreign aid. While some countries, in particular members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), have themselves long been donors of aid, others have been highly dependent on the financial support received from more prosperous countries. Thus, one cannot but wonder how populism – in the US and Europe – and its implication for foreign aid, might impact the development and security of the MENA region. With this issue in mind, this EDA Insight examines the change in US foreign aid policy and its implications for the MENA region.

It argues that Trump's populism has already left a mark on foreign aid policy, especially as evidenced by his budget request to the Congress for fiscal year 2018 (also called 'A Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again')³. After a quick overview of the literature on populism and the history of US foreign aid and its influence in MENA, this brief discusses the implications of Trump's emerging foreign aid policy, which prioritizes national and military security above all. In

a final analysis this brief indicates the strong role the Congress plays in the approval and implementation of the Budget Blueprint, which is likely to be less stringent than the Trump Administration desires. It concludes with some policy recommendations in response to Trump's proposed foreign aid budget and priorities.

Why Is It Important?

- Populist sentiments have been on the rise in the US at a time when the Middle East region has been faced with major security and humanitarian crises. Although populists do not necessarily promote isolationism, they seek more popular sovereignty and favor foreign policy that resonates with the electorate. Thus, an analysis of President Trump's foreign aid objectives helps regional leaders to design policies that more effectively respond to crises while anticipating how US engagement in the region is likely to develop.

- In practice, it is not only the quantity of development and humanitarian assistance that matters, but also the types of projects addressed. A close look at the 'Budget Blueprint' facilitates a better understanding of the direction that a Trump Administration aims to take when it comes to foreign aid generally, and aid to MENA more specifically.

- The Middle East is the largest recipient of US assistance with 35 percent of its foreign aid budget spent primarily on Israel, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine (West Bank/Gaza). Ongoing conflicts have been challenging the control of central governments of Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen as offshoots of Al Qaeda and Daesh have been threatening security in the Middle East and beyond. Thus, it is important to understand the extent to which the stabilization of the region and security considerations play a role in foreign aid policy.

Domestic Determinants of Aid Policies

Generally, foreign aid policy is formulated while taking into consideration the reality of domestic politics of a country, including national needs and citizens' demands of their politicians. Thus, changing political realities can shift donors' priorities. In recognition of this, the literature examining domestic determinants of foreign aid policy has identified a series of findings linking national and international politics. Three of those findings are particularly pertinent to this Insight.

First, domestic political configurations are significant factors impacting foreign aid policy. Fleck and Kilby (2006) have found, for example, that changing interests and policies of different presidential administrations

as well as their economic and political context have historically impacted US bilateral aid allocations. This has been evident in a variety of empirical studies where geopolitical conditions have swayed aid allocation decisions.⁴ This 'politicization' of aid can be seen, for example, in the higher economic aid the Bush Administration disbursed to those party to the 'Coalition of the Willing', an act that was reversed during the Obama Administration.⁵

Second, and relatedly, the political ideology of the governing leadership impacts levels of foreign aid. In particular, Thérien & Noël (2000) argue that conservative governments are associated with less aid, while social-democratic governments are associated with a more generous welfare policy at home and higher aid levels abroad. This also rings true in the American case, where generally Republicans have a less favorable view of foreign aid while Democrats view aid as a vital extension of national security.

Third, donor motivations play an important role in foreign aid policy. In a seminal work, Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that the US primarily targeted poverty, democracy and governance with an emphasis on the Middle East, while France invested in its former colonies without focusing on poverty or democracy. Donor motivations have been central to other studies as well where Lancaster (2007) shows that in times of economic malaise, donors may use aid for commercial reasons in order to promote their own domestic economic development. Lumsdaine (1993) and Hattori (2003), on the other hand, demonstrate that absent economic concerns, donors are more likely to act on altruistic motivations when it comes to aid allocation.

In sum, a cursory overview of this literature indicates that foreign aid policies have been evolving over time, reflecting domestic political configurations and geopolitical considerations of donor governments. Interestingly, while much has been written about the political left-right divide and the varying policies associated with different political parties, the literature is less developed when it comes to populism and its effects on foreign aid policy. This is largely due to the slippery nature of the term 'populism' which defies a common definition. However, a nascent literature has been unwrapping populism as a concept and shedding light on the variety of populist movements emerging in Europe and the US.⁶

Tenets of Populism

Populism is neither a political ideology nor a political party. Rather, populism is a political discourse that is

anti-elitist, pitting 'us' against the 'other' and thereby transcending the political left and right divides. For those on the right, the elite include the state, politicians and intellectuals, while for those on the left, the elite are banks and big businesses. According to Mudde (2004), populism is a 'thin ideology' or a framework that sets up the 'common people' against a 'corrupt elite'. This 'thin' ideology can be attached to 'thick' ideologies, such as nationalism, socialism, and racism.⁷ Thus, both left-wing and right-wing populism are exclusionary. Their main difference is based on whom they exclude, determined by their ideology (e.g. socialism or nationalism).

This is particularly visible in comparing recent political developments in the US and the UK, where the disenfranchised masses offered their support to politically diverging populist leaders. In the US, populists turned to either Donald Trump (a Republican billionaire businessman-turned-politician) or Bernie Sanders (a Democrat, self-identifying as a democratic socialist) while in the UK, they turned to either Nigel Farage (formerly leader of the right-wing UK Independence Party) or Jeremy Corbyn (leader of the Labour Party, self-identifying as a democratic socialist).

With regard to foreign aid, in a recent publication examining the growing presence of populist politicians and their influence in foreign policy, the European Policy Center (2016) found that right-wing populists tend to argue for cutting foreign aid, as they see it as a waste of good money that could be spent at home. Some among right-wing populists take a compromise position and do not call for an outright cutting of aid, but rather for tying it to national security considerations. Left-wing populists, on the other hand, take on a more internationalist approach to aid that is based on the protection of human rights.

Thus, populists on the left and right give diametrically oppositional meanings to the term populism. The current economic and refugee crises have helped highlight these right-wing and left-wing populists' diverging views on what politicians ought to do. Rising economic insecurity and greater wealth inequality have fueled resentment of political classes and the institutions they have created.

At the same time, rising numbers of refugees, particularly from the Middle East and Africa, have increased nativist calls for a return to cultural roots. In the case of the US, these crises have emerged in tandem, generating a right-wing populist movement that is suspicious of the political establishment and resentful of immigrants.

Evolution of US Foreign Aid

The history of Western development assistance has been closely tied to the post-World War II reconstruction of a liberal world order, heralded by the United States of America. According to the United Nations Charter, one of the underpinning objectives of the international system is to pursue 'social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.'⁸ However, political rivalries and national security objectives have often turned foreign aid into a potent policy tool.

President Truman initiated the Marshall Plan after the end of World War II in order to rebuild the economies of Western Europe and to stop any further communist encroachment by the Soviet Union. A series of foreign assistance programs were created throughout the 1960s aimed at fighting the spread of communism, while throughout the 1970s and 1980s, foreign aid was primarily channeled to those fighting leftist regimes in Latin America, Asia and Africa.

The end of the Cold War initially led to the assessment that aid had lost its political purpose. Consequently, Official Development Assistance (ODA) declined during the course of the 1990s (see Figure 1). Geopolitical changes subsequent to the Soviet collapse, proliferation of civil wars, and growing emphasis on globalization's transnational effects created a new global agenda for foreign aid and development policy.

The new millennium offered a new opportunity to reassess the decline in foreign aid and its implications for an increasingly interdependent world. The international community entered the 21st century with a global promise to eradicate extreme poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals in pursuit of progress in health, education, gender equality, environment, and development cooperation.


Box 1: Evolution of Foreign Aid until the end of the Cold War

The use of foreign aid as a tool of US diplomacy dates back to the end of World War II. In the early days of the Cold War, the US viewed foreign assistance as a great means to enhance national security by undermining communism and promoting liberal capitalism. In the 1960s, at the height of the Vietnam War, foreign aid was attacked as an imperialistic project that facilitated direct involvement of the US in foreign countries.

However, the easing of geopolitical tensions between the US and the Soviet Union opened up space for an emphasis on the humanitarian aspects of aid. This was particularly visible when Robert McNamara took the helm at the World Bank and promoted aid for poverty alleviation that would meet people's basic needs in education, health, sanitation, and so on. Nevertheless, the use of aid to buy political allegiance continued until the end of the Cold War, and thereafter.

The de-politicization of aid did, however, not last long. The 'War on Terror' following on the heels of the 9/11 attacks once again changed the rationale for aid. Both the geographical focus and the discourse shifted to fragile states, in particular the rebuilding of Afghanistan. In an attempt to support the frontline countries and fragile states possibly breeding terrorism, increased US foreign aid was directed towards economic growth and democracy promotion. As Figure 1 shows, throughout the first decade of the century, the US government increased its foreign aid budget once again. However, it still remains at one-third of what it used to be in the early 1960s.

Figure 1: Net ODA (Total, % of GNI) US vs. DAC Countries, 1960-2016



Source: OECD-DAC 2017

During this period, performance-based aid dominated. Through the creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation by US Congress, the US provided billions of dollars to select countries that demonstrated they were 'ruling justly, investing in their people, and establishing economic freedom'.⁹ Good governance became an important criterion for US aid allocation, and for example the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) focused primarily on addressing HIV/AIDS in Africa.

US Foreign Aid in the MENA Region

Since the end of World War II, the US has played a key role in the Middle East. Foreign aid has been an important policy tool in advancing US interests in the region, which have included support for the state of Israel, protection of vital energy sources, and the fight against terrorism. Military support and economic aid have been the primary means of US assistance with the top three foreign aid recipients in MENA

being Israel, Egypt and Jordan. According to the Congressional Research Service, since 1946, the US has provided over US\$290 billion in foreign assistance to the region, with more than 80 percent of it directed to Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Palestine (West Bank and Gaza) alone.¹⁰

Most of the aid money to MENA countries falls under Foreign Military Financing (FMF), which essentially provides countries with military support. The biggest portion of this aid - US\$3.1 billion in 2017 - is given to Israel followed by Egypt, a country that has been receiving over US\$1 billion annually from the US since it agreed to a peace treaty with Israel in the Camp David Accords of 1978.¹¹ This aid does not include the increasing involvement of the Department of Defense in providing training and military equipment to the region for counter-terrorism purposes.

In addition to military financing, non-humanitarian US aid to the region covers economic support, development assistance, and global health programs. The primary goal of these programmes is to promote economic development and build human capital in targeted MENA countries. The focus of these programmes has varied over the years depending on the target country. For example, aid provisions for economic assistance make up over 70 percent in the West Bank and Gaza but only 10 percent in Iraq.

Over the past decade, protracted conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen have displaced millions of people and created humanitarian crises that affect these countries and their neighbors that host large numbers of refugees, including Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. In particular, over the last years, the region witnessed over 30 million refugees and internally displaced people in dire need of humanitarian assistance and protection.

The humanitarian portion of US foreign aid increased from 1 percent in 2013 to 3.3 percent in 2016, in response to the rapidly increasing humanitarian calamities in the region.¹² Nevertheless, due to the rise of terrorist networks, such as Al Qaeda and Daesh, since the 'War on Terror' an increased militarization of foreign assistance has emerged.

This was already visible during the Bush and Obama Administrations, but is likely to be accelerated under the Trump Presidency, in line with his populist approach.

Trump's Budget Cuts in MENA Aid

President Trump has been quite vocal about state sovereignty being central to any state's actions. While

the US has traditionally heralded internationalism, President Trump in his first speech at the United Nations General Assembly, uttered the word 'sovereignty' 21 times.¹³ Before his inauguration, some foreign policy experts speculated that Trump's campaign promises would translate into an isolationist foreign policy that arguably would increase jobs at home and decrease US responsibility abroad. His calls to build a wall at the border with Mexico to keep immigrants out, to bring jobs and companies back to the US, and to focus on America's deteriorating infrastructure, strung a chord with many Americans and alarmed those in the development and humanitarian industry.

While Trump's speech confirmed those speculations, his first budget request to the US Congress sheds some light on his foreign aid policy going forward. Indeed, fears of cuts in the foreign aid budget were confirmed in Trump's 'Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again,' which called for streamlining the executive branch, folding the US Agency for International Development (USAID) into the State Department, reducing aid to developing countries by 30 percent, tying development assistance to national security objectives, and refocusing 'economic and development assistance to countries of greatest strategic importance to the US.'¹⁴ The language in the Budget Blueprint mirrors his populist rhetoric, as President Trump vows to 'keep more of America's hard-earned tax dollars at home' and to 'prioritize the security and well-being of Americans, and to ask the rest of the world to step up and pay its fair share.'¹⁵

In addition, building on his campaign promises, Trump's budget proposal requests an increase in spending for defense and immigration enforcement. At the same time, by eliminating the Global Climate Change Initiative while retaining the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, PEPFAR, and US pledges to GAVI (Global Vaccine Alliance), the Trump Administration caters to a constituency that doubts climate change to be man-made but at the same time believes in stemming infectious diseases.

Budget cuts are not only foreseen for bilateral assistance, as the budget proposal also aims to reduce funding to the UN, its affiliated agencies, and other international organizations by 31 percent. At the same time, the Trump Administration has proposed to cut US support to UN peacekeeping efforts by 51 percent. Additionally, it proposes reduced funding for multilateral development banks, including the World Bank, by US\$650 million over three years, thereby potentially jeopardizing projects and programs impacting socioeconomic development, in particular threatening the poor and marginalized.¹⁶

President Trump's foreign policy stance on using aid provisions for the purposes of national security is particularly visible in three specific moves in the Middle East:

- Cuts in bilateral assistance to most MENA countries
- Cuts in democracy and human rights promotion
- Cuts to migration and refugee assistance

First, his request to cut bilateral assistance to most MENA countries, except for two of the largest recipients (Israel and Egypt) indicates his administration's focus on security and military aid over other development and humanitarian aid. As the Project on Middle East Democracy has indicated, Trump's proposed budget 'would represent the highest proportion of US foreign aid - 80 percent - ever devoted to military and security assistance for the MENA region.'¹⁷ Indeed, this initial Congressional budget proposal reflects a trend toward securitization and militarization of aid.

Second, even within the proposed aid for economic assistance and political stability, the budget proposal mirrors the Trump administration's apathy towards democracy and human rights promotion.¹⁸ This is shown not only through major cuts to the various programs in the State Department addressing human rights and democracy issues, but also through the administration's request for a 67 percent cut in bilateral aid to Tunisia, by many in the West seen as the only budding democracy in the region.¹⁹

Third, President Trump has proposed drastic cuts to Migration and Refugee Assistance, International Disaster Assistance, and Food for Peace. He does so while the refugee and humanitarian crises in the region have reached an alarming stage. Iraq, Syria and Yemen have witnessed their populations disintegrate, as 14, 11 and 2 million of their citizens, respectively, have become refugees and internally displaced people. In response to the cuts in Food for Peace, the International Rescue Committee has warned of cuts in food aid leading to a doubling of the global famine.²⁰ Furthermore, Jordan and Lebanon, two countries that have been each hosting well over one million Syrians will also see their allocated funds cut by around 22 percent.

These proposals indicate that the populist rhetoric in the US has translated into a foreign aid policy approach that is much more oriented towards issues that, arguably, more immediately impact American national security. Incidentally, while the moral imperative to help those in need has been central to US foreign aid, President Trump's budget proposal cuts humanitarian aid while maintaining the flow of funds for security and military purposes to Israel and Egypt.

President Trump has made it clear that his administration's focus will be on advancing American national security by increasing funds for defense, border security, and immigration enforcement. The focus on military and security assistance to MENA is making US engagement in the region even more militarized while undermining humanitarian assistance, investment in human capital, and economic growth.

This shift in focus takes place simultaneous with the Administration's recognition that sixty percent of the population in the region is under the age of 25, with an average youth unemployment of 45 percent. In the Congressional Budget Justification, suggestions to prevent young people from resorting to violence and extremist organizations out of frustration and in pursuit of income include 'economic opportunities and creating jobs to counter the unemployment crisis.'²¹ Nevertheless, the budget proposal cuts almost half of the money currently targeted at economic development while decreasing the overall budget for MENA by US\$850 million.²²

It is important to note here that the Congress debated the Budget Blueprint in October 2017 and rejected many of the proposed cuts to MENA. In particular, members of the House Foreign Aid Spending Panel argued for increasing proposed budgets to key US allies, including Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. As a result, the proposed budget for Jordan was increased from US\$1 billion to US\$1.28 while Egypt's economic assistance was doubled from the suggested US\$ 75 million to US\$150 million. The biggest winner was, however, Tunisia, who saw its allocated aid proposal more than triple from US\$55 million to US\$165 million. Although the rhetoric and the overall trends are not impacted by these changes, they do indicated the important role the Congress has taken in the implementation of the Budget Blueprint and its potential implications.

In response to these developments, the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council could well play a leading role. Historically, the GCC donors have accounted for a great portion of aid by countries outside of the OECD DAC; as much as 75 percent from 1975 to 2008.²³ As an important part of the international donor community, GCC donors can fill the void left by the US by allocating funds for development assistance projects that address humanitarian needs, invest in the people, and support economic growth. The humanitarian vision of Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the UAE's founding father, paved the road for the UAE to become an exemplary donor. Among other things, the UAE became the first GCC country to welcome 15,000 displaced people from Syria over the next five years.²⁴ Moreover, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and

Development, the UAE has been a top five donor over the past four years in terms of ODA as a percentage of its Gross National Income (GNI), spending over US\$4 billion on development assistance in 2016 alone.²⁵ While the international community has been encouraging donor countries to spend at least 0.7 percent of their GNI on development assistance, the UAE has positioned itself as a leading donor by spending 1.12 percent of its GNI on humanitarian aid.²⁶ This trend is highly laudable and should be emulated by other donor countries.

Nevertheless, given the direction that US foreign aid policy is taking, it becomes imperative that GCC member countries become even more targeted with the allocation of their aid and expand their assistance beyond those in dire humanitarian need. The recently published UAE Foreign Aid Strategy is a step in that direction. In particular, as the US is decreasing its investments in human capital and economic growth, development projects spearheaded by MENA's donor countries could fill that gap.

To advance human capital, the UAE could increasingly focus investments in MENA's youth via educational, training, and occupational programs. Indeed, this could be one productive and fruitful means of allocating development assistance in the region, particularly at a time when young people between the ages of 15 and 29 compose more than 30 percent of the working-age population in the region and at the same time face the highest unemployment levels in the world.²⁷

As such, it is important that MENA countries, both recipients and donors of aid, pay particular attention to development assistance directed at youth skill creation and employability. These initiatives would act preventatively to fill potentially anticipated funding gaps while also gainfully integrating young people in society, thereby demonstrating that the enhancement of national security does not solely depend on defense funding.

In addition, UAE's foreign aid could be targeted at creating opportunities for entrepreneurial projects and small and medium enterprises, thereby not only helping grow the private sector but also contribute to economic growth. In particular, collaborating with other nations in MENA and investing in regional trade and other productive initiatives could benefit the region both in terms of its economy as well as its stability.

Finally, the UAE has been a pioneer in making Sustainable Development Goals a top national priority, while aligning them with Vision 2021 and their national foreign aid policy. As such, expanding investments in technological innovation, infrastructure, and renewable energy in the MENA region would not only benefit the environment, but the MENA societies at large.

Endnotes

- 1) Donald Trump received 304 Electoral votes while Hillary Clinton, the Democratic candidate, secured the popular vote by almost 3 million votes. See "Official 2016 Presidential General Election Results," *Federal Election Commission*, January 30, 2017, accessed April 11, 2017, <https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016presgeresults.pdf>.
- 2) According to Jan-Werner Mueller, there are distinctions to be made in the category called populist. Exclusive populism, which is more commonly found in Europe, stigmatizes "foreign groups" such as Roma and refugees, and excludes them from the people. Inclusive populism, which is more common in Latin America, opens up the political space to stigmatized groups, such as minorities, indigenous peoples, and the poor. See Jan-Werner Muller, *What is Populism?* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).
- 3) Office of Management and Budget, *America First: A Budget Blueprint to Make America Great Again* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Services, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/2018_blueprint.pdf. (accessed April 11, 2017).
- 4) Thad Dunning, "Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility, and Democracy in Africa," *International Organization*, 58.2 (2004): 409-23.
- 5) Douglas M. Gibler and Steven V. Miller, "Comparing the Foreign Aid Policies of Presidents Bush and Obama," *Social Science Quarterly*, October 9, 2012, onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6237.2012.00909.x/pdf. (accessed October 30, 2017).
- 6) "Europe's Troublemakers: The Populist Challenge to Foreign Policy," *European Policy Center* (February 2016).
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- 8) United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations* (October 1945).
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- 10) Jeremy M. Sharp and Carla E. Humud, "US Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2016 Request," *Congressional Research Service*, October 19, 2015.
- 11) Nasim Ahmed, "Rethinking Foreign Aid in the Middle East," *Middle East Monitor*, January 25, 2017, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170125-rethinking-foreign-aid-in-the-middle-east/>(accessed August 27, 2017).
- 12) Stephen McNerney and Cole Bockenfeld, *The Foreign Affairs Budget: Democracy, Governance, and Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa* (Washington, DC: POMED, 2017), 83.
- 13) Greg Jaffe and Karen DeYoung, "In Trump's UN Speech, emphasis on sovereignty echoes his domestic agenda," *The Washington Post*, September 19, 2017.
- 14) Office of Management and Budget, *America First*, 1.
- 15) *Ibid.*, 1-2.
- 16) *Ibid.*, 34.
- 17) McNerney and Bockenfeld, *The Foreign Affairs Budget*, 3.
- 18) Research suggests that President Trump's predecessors during the 21st century at least rhetorically highlighted good governance and respect for human rights as conditions of aid. In actuality, however, these factors seem to have been neglected in aid disbursements. See Gibler and Miller, "Comparing the Foreign Aid Policies of Presidents Bush and Obama."
- 19) The State Department has a series of programs dedicated to supporting civil society, promoting democratic participation, addressing human rights, and so on. These include the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; the Middle East Partnership Initiative; and the Near East Regional Democracy Fund. For more information, see Jeremy M. Sharp and Carla E. Humud, "US Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY2016 Request," *Congressional Research Service*, October 19, 2015.
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- 21) 115th Congress, First Session, 30 September 2017."
- 22) US Department of State, *Congressional Budget Justification*, p. 84.
- 23) Mustapha Rouis, "Arab Development Assistance: Four Decades of Cooperation," *MENA Knowledge and Learning Quick Notes Series No. 28* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010).
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- 27) OECD, *Youth in the MENA Region: How to Bring Them In* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2016) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264265721-en> (accessed September 21, 2017).